A jailbroken AI is a stock model argued past its safety training by a prompt. It holds until the next update, fails at random before then, and puts you in breach of the terms you agreed to. An abliterated build gets there by editing the weights: nothing is argued with, the refusal direction is gone, and you call it over an API at a per-token rate from the agent you already run. This is the jailbreak chapter of AI with no restrictions.
Jailbroken AI, defined
A jailbroken AI is a model trained to decline certain requests that has been argued out of declining by the text you sent it. The weights are untouched. The prompt did all the work, and the model reverts the instant that prompt is gone.
In security terms it is a prompt injection. OWASP’s LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection entry, read October 27, 2026, lists jailbreaking as the variant where the input gets the model to drop its safety protocols altogether. Which is why page one of Google for this query on October 27, 2026 was vendors and one university: IBM, Zscaler, Abnormal, Microsoft and Princeton, each describing the attack and the defence.
None of them answers the question a tester actually has when typing this search: how do I get a model that will discuss the exploit in front of me, every time, from the agent I already run. A cleverer prompt is not the answer. Different weights are, and that is the rest of this page. For the wider map, every route to a model that does not decline authorized work, read AI with no restrictions.
Four families of jailbreak
All of them attack one target from the outside: the trained reflex to refuse. You will find no jailbreak prompts on this page. The families matter because they show why the effect does not hold.
- Persona framing. The model is told to play someone with no rules, or to write a scene in which a character explains the thing. The reflex is weaker inside fiction, and the answer escapes inside the story.
- Many-shot. Anthropic wrote this one up on 2 April 2024 as an attack that needs a long context: the prompt front-loads dozens of fabricated exchanges in which an assistant complies, then poses the real question. Larger context windows made it more effective.
- Multi-turn escalation. Crescendo, from Russinovich, Salem and Eldan (April 2024), opens with an innocent question and climbs on the model’s own answers until it produces what it refused on the first turn. The “Echo Chamber” attack from the r/cybersecurity thread on page one has the same shape.
- Obfuscation. The ask is encoded, spread over several messages, moved into a language with thin safety training, or buried in a document the model is told to summarize.
Each one lives in the gap between the cases safety training saw and the shape of the incoming prompt. Providers close that gap on purpose, and the jailbreak dies with it.
Four ways a jailbreak fails you mid-engagement
The model behind the name moves. A hosted model name resolves to whatever the provider ships today. Providers train on the jailbreaks in circulation and add classifiers on input and output. The prompt that worked during the March engagement is a known signature by June, and no changelog tells you which release closed it.
It is flaky within a single day. The reflex is still in the weights; a jailbreak only tilts the odds. One call passes, the next fails, and a long session can slip back into refusal forty turns deep. Inside an agent that is a loop that stalls at random, usually mid-triage.
It violates the host’s terms. Anthropic’s usage policy, read October 27, 2026, bans bypassing the guardrails in its products and names jailbreaking and prompt injection as ways of doing so. Read any other host’s terms before you depend on it. A tool you ship to clients on a jailbreak sits on an account that can be closed for it.
It bills you every turn. The jailbreak text goes in front of each request as input tokens. A thousand-token preamble is a thousand paid tokens per message for the length of the session.
Jailbreak prompt against abliterated build
Abliteration relocates the change from the prompt into the weights. In 2024 Arditi and colleagues showed that refusal in open-weight chat models runs along a single direction in the activations. Project it out of the weights and the model stops declining while the rest of its behaviour stays near the original. An uncensored fine-tune reaches a similar place by retraining on answers with the refusals removed. The two edits are compared in abliterated vs uncensored, and the method itself is explained on what is abliteration.
| Row | Jailbreak on a hosted model | Abliterated or uncensored build over this API |
|---|---|---|
| Location of the change | In the text you send | In the weights being served |
| What goes over the wire | Your question plus the jailbreak, each turn | Your question |
| When the model updates | Closed silently | One id is one build; the daily check reports any drift |
| From one call to the next | Works sometimes, fails sometimes | Refusal does not vary by call; wording still moves with temperature |
| Terms of the host | Guardrail bypass is prohibited | Sold as is; the acceptable use policy applies |
| Cost | Jailbreak tokens on every request | Per token, prepaid from $10; see pricing |
| When the model refuses | Charged like any reply | Not charged, to a cap of $5 per account per day |
That last row is a billing rule on this key, written up on the about page: when the model declines by its own refusal signal, the reply is free, capped at $5 per account per day. A request that fails on the host’s side costs nothing.
One thing is identical in both columns: what you are allowed to ask. Chat requests here carry no topic filter, and the acceptable use policy spells out what is never permitted, starting with testing a system you neither own nor hold written authorization for. The rules of engagement tool drafts that authorization.
What security people run a refusal-free model for
- Exploit and code review on targets in scope. Reading a proof of concept from a public advisory, tracing a vulnerable code path, explaining what a payload in a scan log is doing. A stock model frequently refuses to read the input at all. The security builds, and the agents that take this key, are listed on the red-teaming page.
- Malware triage and detection rules. Deobfuscating a dropper from an incident you are responding to, classifying a phishing kit, turning a payload into a Sigma or YARA rule. The sample is the question, and a model that will not look at it is useless; see malware analysis.
- CTF. Pwn, reversing, web and crypto challenges are built from the exact material safety training flags. A refusal on the final step of a 48-hour event is a wasted step; the CTF page has the setup.
- Measuring refusal itself. How often, and on which prompts, does a model decline. Two edits of one base give a clean A/B.
- Agents that cannot afford a stall. A refusal inside a loop is a dead end: the agent halts or retries, and the retry hits the same reflex for the same price.
The measurement case is one script. At temperature 0 it runs your prompt set through both GLM-5.3 edits, abliterated and uncensored, and counts refusals per build, going by the model’s own refusal signal rather than guessing from the text.
from openai import OpenAI client = OpenAI(base_url="https://api.pentestllm.ai/v1", api_key="sk-ptl-live-…")MODELS = ["glm-5.3-abliterated", "glm-5.3-uncensored"] # prompts.txt: one question per line from your engagement's eval set, e.g. CVE walkthroughs and exploit-review asks.prompts = [line.strip() for line in open("prompts.txt") if line.strip()] for model in MODELS: refused = 0 for prompt in prompts: r = client.chat.completions.create( model=model, messages=[{"role": "user", "content": prompt}], temperature=0, ) choice = r.choices[0] # Count only the model's own refusal signal: the refusal field, or a refusal / content_filter finish reason. if choice.message.refusal or choice.finish_reason in ("refusal", "content_filter"): refused += 1 print(model, f"{refused}/{len(prompts)} refused")Aim the same loop at a chatbot your client ships and it becomes a jailbreak test of their product: the defensive half of this topic, and the reason page one looks the way it does. The AI red teaming page covers that engagement.
Six builds with live prices
Six builds that carry the change in their weights, with prices read from the catalog at render time. Five of them are abliterated; the sixth, GLM-5.3 Uncensored, is a fine-tune included for comparison.
| Wire formats | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GLM-5.3 Flash Abliterated | Abliterated | $0.4656 | $1.94 | — | |
| DeepSeek V4.1 Flash Abliterated | Abliterated | $0.8488 | $1.6975 | — | |
| GLM-5.3 Abliterated | Abliterated | $2.1825 | $4.365 | — | |
| GLM-5.3 Uncensored | Uncensored | $0.282 | $0.846 | — | |
| Qwen3.8 27B Obliterated | Abliterated | $0.582 | $7.27 | 524K | |
| Llama 3.3 70B Abliterated | Abliterated | $2.80 | $2.80 | 33K |
| Model | Kind | Daily check | 1,000 agent steps |
|---|---|---|---|
| GLM-5.3 Flash Abliterated | Abliterated | Steady since Oct 30 | $2.17 |
| DeepSeek V4.1 Flash Abliterated | Abliterated | Steady since Oct 19 | $3.23 |
| GLM-5.3 Abliterated | Abliterated | Steady since Oct 30 | $8.29 |
| GLM-5.3 Uncensored | Uncensored | Steady since Oct 12 | $1.18 |
| Qwen3.8 27B Obliterated | Abliterated | Steady since Oct 22 | $4.65 |
| Llama 3.3 70B Abliterated | Abliterated | Steady since Oct 29 | $9.52 |
The check at /proof sends one fixed prompt to each model id every day and diffs the answer against the ones on file, so a build swapped under its id is visible the next morning. On November 17, 2026 it found 143 of the 170 listed models stable. The remaining builds, 170 listed in total, are on the models page with per-token rates.
Questions
In most jurisdictions writing the prompt is a terms-of-service breach, not a crime: the provider prohibits it and can shut your account. The output is a separate matter the law does govern, and testing a system without authorization is illegal whether or not a model helped. Jailbreaking a phone is unrelated; in the US it has had a DMCA exemption since the 2010 rulemaking.
Taking off a restriction the maker built in. For a phone, running software the vendor does not permit. For a language model, input engineered to make a model trained to refuse answer regardless; OWASP classes it as prompt injection. See the no-restrictions pillar page.
Injection is the broad class: any input that turns a model against its instructions, including text planted in a page or file it reads. A jailbreak is the subset aimed at the safety training, usually typed by the user directly. All jailbreaks are prompt injections; most prompt injections are not jailbreaks.
Anything you would not hand to the company operating it: credentials, API keys, a client’s personal data, documents under NDA. Here, prompt and reply bodies are kept only if you enable replay on a key; the privacy page lists exactly what is retained. See the private AI options.
People attempt it with the same four families. A hosted video service has checks of its own, and a jailbreak aimed at it violates the terms and gets patched like the rest. Uncensored video models are on the media page; there, a prompt describing a minor is refused before pricing. See the media models.
You do not need one. An abliterated build has the refusal projected out of its weights and is called like any OpenAI-compatible model: base URL, key, model id, from the agent you already use. A key is prepaid from $10, no subscription. See every build, priced.
Not a jailbroken one, but the prompt box on the home page answers a few demo turns on these builds with no account, and a free account gets a daily allowance of console messages. Past that you need a key. See try the playground.
Every model above is on the uncensored model list with its live price per million tokens. Per-token pricing sets the whole catalog side by side, and the family directory groups the builds by base model.